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Justice and the Grievance Procédure 
in the Fédéral Public Service 
William R. Moore 
The research findings présentée hère indicate that justice is 
deterred because of législative restrictions that preclude certain 
grievance issues from adjudication. 
The justice of the grievance procédure dépends on the extent to which it 
results in "fair" décisions, arrived at within a reasonable period of time, 
and in turn the extent to which it is perceived to be équitable and efficient. 
This article attempts to détermine whether the grievance procédure in the 
fédéral public service promûtes an acceptable level of justice. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for any person to assess individ-
ual grievances and détermine whether or not the results were "fair". Sub-
jective judgments would be inévitable. Any attempts to define the criteria of 
equity would place questionable limitations on the findings and of course 
one would still be faced with the multitude of unique cases requiring the 
researcher's personal judgment. Similarly, it might be difficult to déter-
mine, from an analysis of individual grievances, whether or not they were 
resolved within a reasonable time frame. An alternative approach, however, 
which is feasible in analyzing grievances in the fédéral public service, is to 
compare the nature of outcomes pertaining to grievances eligible for adjudi-
cation to those whose outcomes are entirely at management's discrétion 
(non-adjudicable). If for example, the outcomes for adjudicable grievances 
were to show a significantly greater proportion of décisions favouring the 
grievor than the corresponding outcomes for non-adjudicable grievances, 
one could argue with some degree of confidence that the législation is in-
équitable to persons unable to secure an independent hearing of their dis-
pute. The analysis, in effect, tests comparatively, management's ability to 
render unbiased décisions on the grievances of its own employées. 
* MOORE, William R., Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. 
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BACKGROUND TO THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
Adjudicable versus Non-Adjudicable 
Not ail grievances that may be presented by an employée are subject to 
third-party détermination (adjudication). That form of relief is available 
only if the grievance is related to: 
(a) the interprétation or application in respect of him/her of a provision of 
a collective agreement or an arbitral award, or 
(b) disciplinary action resulting in discharge, suspension or a financial 
penalty1. 
As in the private sector, the right to proceed to adjudication flows from 
the provisions of the collective agreement. However, unlike private sector 
législation, the Public Service Staff Relations Act removes many matters 
from the scope of fédéral public sector bargaining, with the effect that such 
matters are also inéligible for adjudication. Furthermore Sections 56(2)(a) 
(b) prohibit the altération or élimination of any term or condition which 
would require the enactment or amendment of any législation by Parlia-
ment, except for purposes of appropriating money. Consequently, exam-
ples of issues removed from the scope of adjudication include grievances 
relating to such topics as appointments, promotions, lay-offs, transfers, 
training, and appraisals. 
The Procédure 
The maximum number of grievance levels in the fédéral public service 
is four. In practice, most departments hâve instituted a three tier System. 
When a grievance is filed at the first level, it is heard by local management. 
If the grievance is advanced to the second level, then a higher level of man-
agement passes judgment. Then, assuming that the grievance is presented at 
the final level, the Deputy Head or more usually his delegated représenta-
tive, a Staff Relations Officer or perhaps an Assistant Deputy Minister 
(ADM). Most grievance actions are terminated at the final level; however, if 
a member is denied the requested remedy and wishes to pursue matters fur-
ther, the bargaining agent may represent him at adjudication providing two 
conditions are met: (1) The grievance must be adjudicative in nature, and 
(2) The union's Executive Management Committee (EMC) must give its ap-
proval. 
i Section 90(1) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S. c. P-35. See also Section 
98 which allows either the employer or bargaining agent to file a grievance seeking to enforce 
an alleged obligation arising out of the collective agreement or an arbitral award. 
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THE RESEARCH DATA 
The statistical data related in this article has been gathered from one 
employée unit, the Environment Component of the Public Service Alliance 
of Canada. The Environment Component draws its membership of 7 000 
employées from Environment Canada and the newly created (Spring of 
1979) Department of Fisheries and Océans. For the purpose of drawing con-
clusions from the data, employer-employée relations are held to be typified 
by the Component as far as grievances are concerned. Admittedly,, differing 
levels of justice will exist between each departmental staff relations office 
and its respective employée représentatives: however, because the représen-
tatives share so much in common (eg. their goals of representing the em-
ployée, their législation and standardized procédures, their collective agree-
ments, and to some extent their government counterparts) the différences 
are not taken to detract from the findings. 
This study reports the outcomes for 228 grievances, exclusive of ap-
peals and classification grievances2, that were filed with the Environment 
Component over a 2 112 year period — January 1977 to June 1979. 
Each grievance was examined according to the following character-
istics, 
(i) type 
(ii) duration 
(iii) identity of the final management to hear the case 
(iv) outcome 
(v) adjudicability. 
The 228 grievance tabulations were then collected and categorized by 
whether the grievance was adjudicable or non-adjudicable under Section 91 
of the Public Service Staff Relation Act (PSSRA). There were 119 non-
adjudicable grievances representing 16 différent "types" of complaints. For 
purposes of présentation, the 16 types were further organized into 6 larger 
"classes": termination of employment, directives, staffing, spécial leave, 
miscellaneous, and appraisal. The remaining 109 adjudicable grievances 
resulted from 19 "types" of complaints; however, the types were more easi-
ly re-organized so that they are reported in only 5 larger "classes": pay, dis-
cipline, leave, spécial leave, and miscellaneous. 
The outcomes of the adjudicable and the non-adjudicable grievances 
are portrayed in tables. The Consolidated "types", or "classes", are found 
2 Appeals and classification grievances are processed through a separate mechanism. 
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along the left hand column, while the outcomes are depicted along the up-
per, horizontal side. There are 6 catégories of outcomes: 
(1) Granted: The requested remedy is granted in full. 
(2) Denied: The requested remedy is denied in full. 
(3) Partially Granted: The requested remedy is partially granted. 
(4) Abandoned: The grievance is abandoned either by written notice or by 
a failure to transmit the grievance to the next level. 
(5) Resolved: The grievance remedy is informally granted; that is, no for-
mal récognition is given in the form of a written reply from manage-
ment. 
(6) Partially Resolved: The grievance remedy is partially granted, but no 
formai récognition is given in the form of a written reply from manage-
ment. 
In addition to the 6 catégories of outcomes found in the tables, a sim-
plified version of the outcome totals is reported beneath the tables. Percent-
age totals are shown for the "denied" and "abandoned" groupings, while 
the 4 other totals are gathered under the heading of "pro-grievor action". 
The title "pro-grievor action" is given to indicate that the grievance initi-
ated some response from management in favour of the grievor. 
For purposes of présentation, the various units of data will be referred 
to as exhibits. 
DATA INTERPRETATION AND HIGHLIGHTS 
Does It Make a Différence if a Grievance Is Not Adjudicable? 
EXHIBIT 1 — FIRST AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL RESULTS 
At first glance, one is struck by the fact that the pro-grievor action 
taken at the lower levels is noticeably greater if the grievance is adjudicable. 
Upon taking a closer look, it seems that much of the pro-grievor resolutions 
at the early stages are concerned with matters of pay (14 out of 23). What 
does this say about the différence in outcomes? It could be suggested that 
pay grievances hâve developed a more definite set of précédents because of 
adjudication décisions which are followed by lower management; however, 
it is unlikely that this would account for such a différence in the success 
rates of pay grievances over other adjudicable grievances. The most likely 
explanation is that local and régional management better understand pay 
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First and Intermediate Level Results 
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Standard déviation for the individual grievances 8 21 
* Ail 7 Spécial Leave Cases and 13 of the 19 Discipline Cases were heard only at the final level. 
** Note: ail days are working days (e.g. Monday thru Friday, less paid holidays). 
*** Ail 7 Spécial Leave Cases were heard only at the final level. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Final Level Results 
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Average time to final level décision: 61.5 days. 
Standard déviation of average time for the 5 types of cases: 8.3 days. 
Standard déviation for the individual grievances: 36 days. 
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Termination of 
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Directives 
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Totals 
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Average time to final level décision: 62 days. 
Standard déviation of average time for the 6 types of cases: 5.4 days. 
Standard déviation for the individual grievances: 37.6 days. 
EXHIBIT 3 
Overall Results for the Component National Office (e.g. outcome of ail grievances filed with 
the Environment Component at the Final Level and pre-Final Level stage). 
Adjudicable Non -A djudicable 
Table 3 (a) Table 3(bj 
G D PG A R PR Totals 
Termination of 
G D PG A R PR Total 
Pay 9 12 1 4 15 1 42 Employment 1 17 3 2 6 — 29 
Discipline 1 14 2 4 — — 21 Directives 6 13 — 4 3 — 26 
Leave 1 11 2 3 1 2 20 Staffing 3 13 1 4 2 — 23 
Spécial Leave 2 5 — — — — 7 Spécial Leave — 6 1 — — — 7 
Miscellaneous 7 4 — 5 3 — 19 Miscellaneous 2 3 — 1 9 — 15 
Totals 20 46 5 16 19 3 109 Appraisal 8 3 — 3 5 — 19 
% Totals 18.3 42.2 4.6 14.7 17.4 2.8 Totals 
% Totals 
20 
16.8 
55 
46.2 
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4.2 
14 
11.8 
25 
21 
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Average time: 54.4 working days. 
Pro-grievor action 43.1% Pro-grievor action 42. % 
Denied 42.2% Denied 46.2% 
Abandoned 14.7% Abandoned 11.8% 
100% 
Average time for the resolution of a grievance filed with the Component 
National Office (excluding adjudication): 39.6 days. 
100% 
Average time for the resolution of a grievance fiied with the Component 
National Office (excluding adjudication): 54.4 days. 
EXHIBIT 4 
Post-Grievance Results 
Adjudicable Grievances 
Table 4(a) 
Adjudication & Court 
G D P A 
Pay 2 3* — — 
Discipline — 1 8 — 
Leave 1 — — — 
Spécial Leave — — — — 
Miscellaneous — — — — 
Total 
% Totals 
Non-Adjudicable Grievances 
3 + 3< 
10 
3 
3 
Only 2 non-adjudicable grievances were sent to court. Both cases dealt 
with Rejection on Probation and both were conceded out of court by 
Treasury Board. One took approximately 500 working days, the other 
450 working days.' 
Pro-grievor action 
Denied 
3 
13.6 
81.8% 
18.2% 
1+3* 
18.2 36.4 
7 
31.8 
19 + 3* 
* Refers to 3 cases on Severance Pay which lost after an appeal by the government. 
Average time spent in adjudication: 111 days. 
Average time spent on 3 spécial cases: 400 days in adjudication, 
700 days in court. 
EXHIBIT 5 
Adjudicable Grievances 
Final Standings after Court and Adjudication 
Table 5(a) 
Non-Adjudicable Grievances 
After Court and 
Adjudication 
G D P A R PR Totals 
After Court 
Results 
G D 
Pay 11* 9* 1 4 16* 1 42 
Termination of 
Employaient 1* 15* 
Discipline 1 5* 10* 4 1* — 21 Directives 6 13 
Leave 2* 8* 2 3 3* 2 20 Staffing 3 13* 
Spécial Leave 2 2 — — 3 — 7 Spécial Leave — 6 
Miscellaneous 1 4 — 5 3 — 19 Miscellaneous 2 3 
Total 23 28 13 16 26 3 109 Appraisal 8 3 
% Totals 21.1 25.7 11.9 14.7 23.9 2.7 100% Totals 
% Totals 
20 
16.8 
53 
44.5 
Pro-grievor action 
Denied 
Abandoned 
59.6% 
25.7% 
19.7% 
100% 
Pro-grievor action 
Denied 
Abandoned 
43.7% 
44.5% 
11.8% 
100% 
* indicates catégories in which changes in outcome hâve occurred. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
TABLE 6 
The Final Level Hearings: Who Represented Management? 
Staff Relations A DM* 
outcome outcome as 
% of heard 
outcome outcome as 
% of heard 
Granted 28 17.1% 3 50% 
Denied 99 60.4% 2 33.3% 
Partially 
Granted 9 5.5% 
— — 
Abandoned 10 6.1% — — 
Resolved 178 10.4% 1 16.7% 
Partially 
Resolved 1 0.5% 
— — 
164 100% 6 100% 
* Ail 6 cases heard by the ADM were non-adjudicable. 
issues. Not only are pay issues the most fréquent of any they hâve to deal 
with, but the régional personnel offices are responsible for administering 
the pay System. As a resuit, they should hâve the compétence to deal with 
most pay problems. Also unlike the other grievances that local management 
must reply to, a pay grievance is often the resuit of a clérical décision as op-
posed to a management décision. Thus, management probably feels less 
pressured if they grant the grievance because in most cases they are not 
overruling either their own décision or that of a superior's. 
Consequently, since pay grievances explain much of the pro-grievor ac-
tion and they in turn are explained by factors other than adjudication, there 
is not deemed to be, on average, a significant différence between the out-
come of adjudicable and non-adjudicable grievances at the lower levels. 
Conclusion: The level of justice is approximately the same for the two 
grievance types at this stage. 
EXHIBIT 2 — FINAL LEVEL RESULTS 
Grievance outcomes for adjudicable and non-adjudicable grievances at 
the Final Level are approximately the same according to the columnar per-
centage totals. There is, however, perhaps an indication of a différent appli-
cation of justice for Spécial Leave cases. Spécial Leave cases are found in 
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both catégories of grievances: those which could be sent to third parties 
showed slightly higher success rates from the grievor's point of view. More 
will be said about this point when Exhibit 5 is examined. 
Conclusion: There is no significant indication of differing justice levels 
at this stage. Spécial Leave outcomes might show a différence in levels but it 
is difficult to say for sure at this point. 
EXHIBIT 3 — OVERALL RESULTS FOR ALL GRIEVANCES IN WHICH THE 
ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT NATIONAL OFFICE WAS INVOLVED 
Thèse tables serve to suggest that, on average, outcomes for adjudi-
cable grievances are not radically différent than outcomes for non-
adjudicable grievances. This resuit is surprising. One might expect the déci-
sions to reflect a pro-management bias in the cases where management is 
itself the final authority. Indeed if the analysis was to stop hère, it might 
well be concluded that the figures contained no real évidence of injustice. 
The analysis however, does not stop at this point. It is important to examine 
the results of those cases pursued by way of Adjudication and/or Fédéral 
Court. 
EXHIBITS 4 AND 5 — ADJUDICATION AND COURT RESULTS 
The most significant story, on the effect of adjudication, is told in Ex-
hibits 4 and 5. Before viewing the adjudication and court results the level of 
justice seems to be fairly equal for ail grievances. This same view is quickly 
discarded after looking at the adjudication results. Virtually 10% (22 of 
228) of ail grievances or 20% of ail adjudicable grievances handled by the 
Environment Component found their way to adjudication. Of thèse, 4 in 5 
engendered action favourable to the grievor. This provides a stark contrast 
with the situation for non-adjudicable grievances. There, 100% of the court 
cases were settled in favour of the grievor, but the volume of cases was 2 not 
22. Evidently, justice took a beating as far as the non-adjudicable cases 
were concerned. 
The overall effect is visible in Exhibit 5. The pro-grievor action, instead 
of being the same in Tables 5(a) and 5(b), is now significantly greater for the 
adjudicable grievances. The resuit is highlighted when the individual griev-
ance types are examined. Every single class of adjudicable grievance indi-
cates more pro-grievor action than déniais, whereas the same claim can be 
made for only 2 out of 6 non-adjudicable classes (miscellaneous and ap-
praisal). 
JUSTICE AND THE GGRIEVANCE PROCÉDURE IN THE FÉDÉRAL PUBLIC SERVICE 859 
Furthermore, there is a radical différence in the outcomes of Spécial 
Leave grievances. Spécial Leave cases provide a unique opportunity to 
search for différent levels of justice. Results are found in both tables 
because the particular clause which permits adjudication was only gradually 
being included in différent collective agreements. Three Spécial Leave cases 
were conceded by Treasury Board just before adjudication bringing the 
total to 5 out of 7 cases fully granted. Whether or not there would hâve been 
such a turn around for the 6 corresponding déniais in Table 5(b) cannot be 
claimed with certainty; however, it looks like a good bet. Managements cri-
teria for granting spécial leave seems to hâve been too stringent, but for 
some grievors there was no recourse. 
JUSTICE AT THE DIFFERENT STAGES 
There is a steady improvement in success rates for the grievor the far-
ther his grievance advances. Some grievances however, are terminated pre-
maturely. Thirty grievances (13.2%), for example, were abandoned. To the 
extent that the abandonments resulted from (a) fear of reprisais, (b) diffi-
culties or barriers to maintaining the grievance, or (c) discouragement about 
achieving a suitable redress, then justice was deterred. Even more encom-
passing in its influence on justice though, is the effect, previously empha-
sized, of denying recourse to adjudication for particular grievance types. 
Too many grievances are prematurely terminated because of an inéquitable 
section in the législation that restricts the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Staff Relations Board (PSSRB). 
THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
As one looks over the tabulated outcomes for each of the grievance 
levels, it becomes obvious that, except perhaps for 2nd level management, 
each successive hearing level overturns a significant amount of the previous 
décisions. 
Any number of reasons may exist to explain why higher levels of man-
agement will grant remédies that lower levels denied. Sometimes it is be-
cause of the expertise involved, sometimes because of the more distanced 
perspective and often it is due to the authority vested in the décision maker. 
The aspect of perspective and authority can be very important. Disciplinary 
discharge cases for instance, are heard only at the final level. A few more 
resolved in favour of the grievor but most were denied. To overturn a disci-
plinary discharge, the décision of the Deputy Head must be reversed be-
cause it is (s)he that originally signed the discharge. Consequently, if the 
Final Level hearing is held with a staff relations officer, the question of 
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authority may play a prominent part in the décision. The staff relations of-
ficer cannot simply change his own mind. He must also convince his supe-
riors that the original décision was faulty. This can be particularly embar-
rassing when the Staff Relations Branch is likely to hâve approved the dis-
charge in the first place. It seems reasonable to suggest that a conflict of in-
terest exists when staff relations is faced with overturning the décision of a 
superior, especially when it is évident that most (9 out of 14) disciplinary 
discharge cases are in some way overturned in the grievor's favour at adju-
dication. 
This same conflict of interest between the authority of junior manage-
ment and that of senior management exists in grievances which cannot be 
heard by an independent third party. Termination of employment cases 
provide excellent proof of this. The only persons with the authority neces-
sary to terminate someone's employment with the Public Service are either 
the Deputy Minister or the appropriate ADM. Thus, when a related griev-
ance is filed, the junior management reply is basically a formality because 
the management involved could not overrule their superior even if (s)he 
wanted to. Since, in the case of most Final Level hearings, it is the staff rela-
tions officers who represent management, the results suggest this same 
reluctance to overturn an order of a superior: most of the pro-grievor action 
was taken informally, outside the grievance procédure; the only grievance 
granted was the resuit of a hearing with the ADM; and what is more, the 
two cases taken to court were eventually conceded by Treasury Board (Ex-
hibit 2). Further support for thinking that a staff relations officer has a dif-
ficult time overcoming the conflict of interest involved with reversing a 
superior's décision is found in Exhibit 6. Far more pro-grievor actions came 
from the ADM than from Staff Relations. One must be cautious in relying 
on this particular exhibit alone because the sample size of "ADM heard" 
cases is very small; however, the findings are consistant with what the pre-
vious exhibits hâve suggested. That is, it is important to deal with someone 
who has the authority to handle the problem and thereby minimize potential 
conflicts of interest. 
CATCH 22 
This last finding is extremely difficult to practice, especially for non-
adjudicable grievances. If a case is "promising" for the grievor and it can 
be sent to adjudication, then at least the grievor has access to an authority 
sufficient to grant the appropriate remedy. A dilemma arises with non-
adjudicable grievances though. Ideally ail non-adjudicable grievances which 
challenge a décision authorized by an ADM should be heard by that same 
ADM, otherwise a conflict of interest is bound to arise when a junior officer 
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considers the conséquences of suggesting to his superior(s) that the ADM 
was misinformed and/or wrong. However, an ADM will soon become upset 
if he is forced to handle numerous grievances. The danger is that he will 
become upset with the Union before he does with the System. If the ADM is 
confronted with handling every grievance to which his authority has in some 
way been involved, the Union will soon lose its credibility. Not ail griev-
ances that reach the Final Level are defensible or even sensible and an ADM 
will become frustrated simply because he will see his Staff Relations Branch 
being by-passed as it probably never has been before. But, as soon as the 
Union tries to maintain credibility by taking only the "promising" non-
adjudicable cases to the ADM, it might just as well concède most of the 
cases it takes to Staff Relations. After ail, if the criteria for a hearing with 
the ADM is a "good" case for the grievor, the implication is that the cases 
to be heard by Staff Relations are not worth bothering the ADM about. 
This scénario is perhaps on the extrême side; nevertheless, it shows the tre-
mendous difficulty of ensuring justice when an independent, authoritative 
third party cannot be applied to. 
Conclusion: There is in ail probability judging from the exhibits pre-
sented, a substantial différence in the justice available to grievors with 
issues that cannot be sent to adjudication versus issues that can be sent to 
adjudication. It would seem therefore that one very feasible solution that 
would improve justice would be to make ail grievances adjudicable. 
What About The Time? 
Are the time delays in grievance settlements significant? The grievances 
were examined on an adjudicable versus non-adjudicable basis as well as on 
an overall basis. 
ADJUDICABLE VERSUS NON-ADJUDICABLE 
Exhibit 1 shows that, on average, adjudicable pro-grievor décisions or 
abandonments tend to take just over half the time (14.3 vs 25.4 days) that 
non-adjudicable grievances take. In addition, the standard déviation for in-
dividual grievances indicate that adjudicable décisions tend to be more con-
sistent about the time taken (e.g., a narrower distribution). Part of the rea-
son for this undoubtedly stems from the dominance of pay grievances. An-
other reason, though, is suggested by a combination of intuition and expé-
rience: since adjudication can be and is used by union représentatives as a 
threat when presenting a grievance at the lower levels, perhaps it contributes 
to faster action by local and régional management. To the extent that this is 
true, the more grievance types that are eligible for adjudication, the fewer 
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time delays at the first levels. Then, in so much as time delays discourage 
justice, faster processing will improve justice. 
It would appear, unfortunately, that on average, cases eligible for ad-
judication which are not solved by local or régional management take just 
as long to be dealt with by the time the final level reply is issued (e.g., 62 
days). This means that adjudicable grievances take slightly longer to process 
at the final level. One reason for this is that both parties may hâve to gather 
more information and/or consult with their adjudication experts. Thus, if 
ail grievances were adjudicable, décisions may corne faster at the lower 
levels, but they would probably be of the same duration by the time the final 
level was issued. 
A closing considération in comparing the duration of the two types of 
grievances is that if a non-adjudicable grievance is to be contested, it has to 
go through the Fédéral Court of Appeals. This can take upwards of two 
years before even a hearing date is set. In comparison, an adjudication hear-
ing will not usually be delayed much more than three months. 
OVERALL 
How significant time delays are in the justice of décisions dépends on a 
multitude of factors: what type of grievance it is, how many people are af-
fected, if money is involved, the emotional state of the parties involved and 
so on. The time taken to render a final décision affects each grievance and 
each grievor differently. The longer the time, the more detrimental the im-
pact on the achievement of justice. Thus, suffice it to say that the shorter 
the time taken, the better. The data suggests that by making ail grievances 
adjudicable, some improvements should occur. Other improvements dé-
pend more on manpower allocations and a cost-benefit analysis, the likes of 
which is beyond the scope of this work. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The data and analysis presented in this article clearly indicate that re-
striction placed on the types of grievances eligible for adjudication create an 
undesirable and unnecessary hindrance to justice. No man made system of 
légal justice will ever be perfect, but whenever the level of justice can rea-
sonably and practicably be improved, every attempt should be made to do 
so. The biggest and most obvious first step to improving the level of justice 
available to fédéral public employées is to allow employée représentatives 
the discrétion to take any type of grievance to adjudication. 
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La justice et la procédure de règlement des griefs dans la 
fonction publique fédérale 
Les relations professionnelles au sein de la fonction publique fédérale sont ré-
gies par une seule loi: la Loi des relations de travail dans la fonction publique 
(L.R.T.F.P.). Contrairement aux lois provinciales du travail, cette loi empêche les 
parties à une convention collective de porter certaines de leurs clauses à l'arbitrage 
(organisme où les griefs sont plaides devant une tierce partie indépendante). Par 
exemple, les différends relatifs aux nominations, aux promotions, aux mises à pied, 
aux mutations, aux notations de même que plusieurs autres ne sont pas «arbitra-
bles». 
L'auteur se demande si les plaignants, dont les griefs ne peuvent être ainsi sou-
mis à l'arbitrage, bénéficient d'une norme de justice comparable aux autres. 
Les données proviennent de la section de l'environnement de l'Alliance de la 
fonction publique du Canada pendant la période s'étendant de janvier 1977 à juin 
1979. 
L'analyse des faits laisse voir que les restrictions imposées dans le cas de certains 
types de griefs créent un obstacle peu souhaitable et inutile à l'exercice de la justice. 
En comparant la façon dont la direction répond aux griefs, selon qu'ils sont ou 
non soumis à l'arbitrage, aux différents stades de la procédure de règlements des 
griefs (pièces 1, 2 et 3), on n'y décèle à première vue aucun indice significatif de pré-
vention contre les personnes dont les griefs ne sont pas «arbitrables». Dans la mesure 
où l'on pouvait s'attendre à l'existence d'un penchant favorable à la direction dans 
les cas où celle-ci est elle-même l'autorité finale, cela est étonnant. Cependant, si l'on 
tient compte du résultat des décisions là où il y a appel à des tierces parties, générale-
ment la Commission des relations de travail dans la fonction publique et, quelque-
fois la Cour fédérale, (pièces 4 et 5), on se rend à l'évidence que la direction penche 
fortement de son propre côté. En pratique, dix pour cent (22 sur 228) de tous les 
griefs ou vingt pour cent de tous les griefs «arbitrables» furent tranchés par une tier-
ce partie indépendante. De ceux-ci, quatre sur cinq se terminèrent par une décision 
favorable au plaignant. C'est là une indication significative de l'importance d'avoir 
accès à un tribunal indépendant. Une révision des décisions se rapportant aux congés 
spéciaux fournit un exemple simple qui permet de souligner ce que démontrent les 
constatations générales. Tenant compte de la clause de la convention, les griefs rela-
tifs aux congés spéciaux peuvent être ou non soumis à l'arbitrage. Parmi celles qui 
étaient admissibles à l'arbitrage, trois griefs furent concédés avant l'audition devant 
la Commission de telle sorte que, à la fin, deux seulement sur sept des affaires soumi-
ses à l'arbitrage furent rejetées, tandis que, dans la catégorie des affaires qui 
n'étaient pas «arbitrables», six des sept plaignants perdirent leur cause. Il est proba-
ble que les critères de la direction pour accorder un congé spécial étaient trop rigou-
reux, mais, pour quelques plaignants, il n'y avait pas d'autre recours. 
En revisant les résultats, une règle générale devient évidente. À l'exception pos-
sible des cadres intermédiaires, chaque niveau successif de décision renverse un nom-
bre considérable de décisions antérieures. Là où l'arbitrage est interdit, il semble rai-
sonnable d'affirmer que plusieurs griefs se terminent prématurément en ce sens que 
le plaignant est forcé d'accepter une décision de la direction qui, autrement, tourne-
rait en sa faveur. 
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Plusieurs facteurs peuvent s'associer et contribuer à expliquer le phénomène de 
la partialité de la direction, mais le principal, c'est le fonctionnement de la responsa-
bilité et de l'autorité entre les différents niveaux de direction. Il est compréhensible 
que les cadres inférieurs soient peu disposés à faire droit à un grief qui peut avoir 
pour conséquence de rescinder une directive donnée par un supérieur. Conclusion 
pratique: il est important de traiter avec quelqu'un qui possède l'autorité nécessaire 
pour trancher le problème et, de ce fait, minimiser le nombre des conflits d'intérêts 
possibles. Malheureusement, cela pose un dilemme au niveau supérieur de la direc-
tion dans le cas des griefs qui ne sont pas «arbitrables». Le syndicat peut choisir de 
défendre l'affaire devant le sous-ministre, un sous-ministre adjoint ou encore un 
fonctionnaire du service du personnel. Idéalement, tous les griefs «non-arbitrables» 
qu exigent une décision du sous-ministre ou d'un sous-ministre adjoint devraient être 
discutés avec ceux-ci. Autrement, un conflit d'intérêt peut se soulever si le fonction-
naire du service du personnel laisse entendre à ses supérieurs qu'ils sont dans l'er-
reur, peut-être même à la suite d'une recommandation faite plus tôt par ce même ser-
vice du personnel. Cependant, si le syndicat se présente toujours devant le sous-
ministre ou un sous-ministre adjoint, il est susceptible de contrarier le fonctionnaire 
supérieur en prenant beaucoup de son temps. Le danger, c'est que ceux-ci deviennent 
indisposés contre le syndicat avant qu'ils ne le soient contre le système lui-même. Si 
le sous-ministre adjoint se voit obligé de traiter chaque grief dans lequel son autorité 
est impliquée, le syndicat perdra sa crédibilité. Ce ne sont pas tous les griefs qui attei-
gnent le stade final qui sont défendables ou même sensés, et un sous-ministre adjoint 
n'appréciera pas que l'on contourne son service du personnel dans de pareilles situa-
tions. D'autre part, si le syndicat se dérobe au service du personnel lorsqu'il s'agit 
d'une bonne cause, il indique d'avance à la direction qu'il estime avoir une bonne af-
faire en main. 
Le scénario précédent, même s'il ne se présente pas dans toutes les affaires, 
montre que des facteurs complexes influent sur un processus judiciaire qui n'est pas 
indépendant. C'est peut-être un hommage à rendre à la direction de dire que, d'une 
façon générale, elle ne semble pas consciemment prendre avantage «d'avoir le der-
nier mot» quand les griefs ne sont pas «arbitrables». Toutefois, le taux élevé des 
gains dans les affaires qui vont à l'arbitrage démontre nettement qu'il n'y a pas de 
substitut à une agence de révision indépendante dans le système judiciaire. En consé-
quence, on peut conclure que la règle de justice dans le fonctionnement du mécanis-
me d'arbitrage des griefs au gouvernement fédéral serait améliorée si la Loi des rela-
tions de travail dans la fonction publique était modifiée de façon à rendre tous les 
griefs admissibles à l'arbitrage. 
